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"While it seems clear the lack of battle experience hampered our formations in Normandy, one must
remark that, although some of the German divisions were subject to the same disability, it appears
to have had a less serious effect on them. The 12th S.S. Panzer Division, which was responsible
for many of our troubles, was formed only in 1943 and had never fought before 7 June 1944. (As
we have seen, however, it did contain a high proportion of experienced officers and N.C.Os. It also
had the advantage, after the first days of the campaign, of having a commander and a senior staff
officer who had special knowledge of the theatre of operations, having exercised there with the 1st
S.S. Panzer Division in 1942.) There were other German divisions committed against us in
Normandy which had not fought before and which nevertheless gave a good account of themselves.
This may have been due in part to the fact that the German formations were on the defensive while
ours were attacking, a more difficult role. Nevertheless, one suspects the Germans contrived to get
more out oftheir training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual
than ours."
C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.277.

The Defeat of the 12th SS
7-10 June 1944
Oliver Haller

I

n the early hours of 6 June 1944, the first
reports of a major Allied operation were
transmitted to the 12th SS Hitleljugend Panzer
Division. 1 In anticipation ofthe long-awaited
Allied invasion of occupied France, a company
was sent to investigate the Caen area. 2 Though
the young soldiers of the division were
uncertain of what actually awaited them, the
first acts in a conflict that would claim most
of their lives were being performed. However,
defeat was not on their minds during that
hectic morning- the men of the 12th SS were
fixed on driving the "little fish" back into the
sea.
The situation confronting the 12th SS
on June 7th was not encouraging. The 716th
Bodenstaendig or Static Division, had lost
two-thirds of its strength and was reduced to
isolated points of resistance. During the

Opposite: "Invasion! The Gennan countenneasures
are in progress!"

initial hours of the 7 June advance, these
were brushed aside as the 7th and 9th
Canadian Infantry Brigades moved forward
in two separate thrusts, while 8th Brigade
dealt with the remaining German strongpoints in the rear areas.
The 9th Brigade's push towards
Carpiquet forced a German reaction to secure
the staging areas for a co-ordinated move
against the Allies. The initial German
response
was
purely
defensive.
Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer intercepted the
Canadian advance with a battlegroup
composed of his 25th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment and 50 PzKpfw IVs from the tank
regiment's second battalion. 3 In the chaotic
melee that erupted, the Germans managed to
blunt and deflect the Canadian advance.
Though 9th Brigade failed to seize their
objectives, they did draw German attention
from 7th Brigade which experienced only
"moderate resistance," mainly "in the form of
9
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The embankment provided the
Canadians a significant barrier to German
armour. In order to advance frontally against
the brigade "fortress," the Germans were
required to first capture the village of Norrey
in order to gain a passage for their tanks
across the embankment. The villages
themselves, consisting of "stone buildings
and narrow thoroughfares," greatly enhanced
the defender's resilience. 5 The Brigade was
also anchored on its left flank by the Mue
River, which was lined with hedges and farm
walls. Worse still for the 12th SS, the natural
terrain of the area consisted of flat fields and
gentle rises interspersed with small wooded
areas. The Canadians were able to use the
church towers to view enemy movements
over a large area.

Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Matheson,
Commanding Officer, Regina Rifles

snipers. "4 By noon D+ 1, 7th Brigade had
settled down in anticipation of the expected
German assault. The Regina Rifle Regiment
established itself astride the Caen-Bayeux
road at Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse. Major
StuartTubb, commanding"C" Company, took
one look at the approaches to Bretteville and
decided to occupy the village of Norrey-enBessin a kilometre to the south. This position
would allow the Reginas to dominate the
approaches to Bretteville and the railway
embankment.
Brigadier Harry Foster
questioned this decision, but LieutenantColonel F.M. Matheson, the commanding
officer of the Reginas, insisted that Major
Tubbs had made the right decision. Foster
accepted his judgement.
Directly to the west, between the
embankment and the highway, the Royal
Winnipeg Rifles occupied Putot-en-Bessin.
The Canadian Scottish Regiment took up a
reserve position in Secqueville-en-Bessin. The
7th Brigade in crossing the Caen-Bayeux
road and seizing the "high ground" in and
around Bretteville, posed a formidable
obstacle to any German advance along the
main lateral highway in Calvados.

The inherent advantages offered by
terrain were not lost on the Canadians. The
7th Brigade busied itself during the lull in the
fighting "to prepare defenses for the counterattack which was almost sure to come." 6 Not
only were the troops given a "moment to relax
and scrounge something to eat, 7 " but the

Mqjor Stuart Tubbs, Commander,
"C" Company, Regina Rifles

10
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From left to right: Standartenfiihrer Kurt Meyer, commanderofthe 25thPanzerGrenadier Regiment, Gruppenfiihrer
Fritz Witt, commander of 12th SS Panzer Division, Obergruppenfiihrer Sepp Dietrich, commander ofl SS Panzer

Corps, Sturmbannfiihrer Hubert Meyer, and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-ChiefWest.

formation's artillery and anti-tank guns were
hustled into position. The guns of the 3rd
Anti-Tank Regiment commanded the
approaches to both flanks and had a clear
line of sight over kilometres of flat and open
terrain. The FOOs (Forward Observation
Officers) of 12th and 13th Field Regiments
were in position as were the machine guns
and mortars of the Cameron Highlanders of
Ottawa.
The men of the Canadian 7th Brigade
were first stirred into action by what appeared
to be a probing attack by the newly-arrived
26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. At 2100
hours on 7 June, the defenders of Putot
"quickly repulsed" a small group of German
infantry. 8 The brigade could only expect an
increase in German effort over the next 24
hours. The 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,
owing to the greater distance it had to travel
and the general lack of information regarding
Allied positions, arrived many hours later

than its sister formation. The Regiment
established its headquarters in Cheux,
approximately 2 kilometres from Norrey. 9 A
potentially dangerous 7 kilometre gap between
Rots and Audrieu was filled, and Meyer's
25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment could
breathe easier knowing their left flank was
defended. 10 However, the flanks of the division
were by no means secure. On the left, near
Audrieu and Cristot, the 12th SS
Reconnaissance Battalion formed the only
obstacle to an Allied flanking attempt by the
British 50th (Northumbrian) Division. PanzerLehr Division had not yet linked up with the
12th ss.
Early on 8 June, Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel, realizing that time was running
short, ordered the Seventh Army to throw the
three armoured divisions of the I SS Panzer
Corps at the advancing British and
Canadians. 11 A concerted effort never
occurred. The 21st Panzer Division, brushing

11
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12th SS Attacks on 7th Brigade. Note that this map is oriented as the Canadian soldiers would have viewed
the battle, with south at the top of the map. Each thick arrow represents a 12th SS attack and the number
indicates the date and time of the attack (ie. 08.0330-8 June, 3:30a.m.).

the right sleeve of the HitleTjugend, had been
so severely mauled on June 6th that it
mustered only 55 tanks, and could not
disengage from combat with 3rd British
Division. 12 Kurt Meyer's 25th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment had committed its three
infantry battalions against the Canadians in
the Buron area, and redeployment elsewhere
was impossible without surrendering Caen. 13
The I SS Panzer Corps could not immediately
field the resources required for a
comprehensive push to the sea.

Despite their inability to concentrate
for a large counterattack against the Canadian
and British divisions, the Germans were still
determined to make preliminary moves for
large-scale offensive operations. The villages
of Norrey, Putot, and Bretteville, held by the
7th Brigade, were to be cleared by the 26th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment in order to open
a corridor along the Caen-Bayeux road for the
division's tanks. The three infantry battalions
of the 26th Regiment were ordered to
overwhelm the Canadians beginning in the
early hours of 8 June. 14

12
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.. D" Company, Regina Rifles
at Cardonville, 8 June 1944
On June 7th, "D" Company
of the Reginas was at
Villeneuve just south of the
railway line with "B" Company to the north near Rots.
After the Kurt Meyer group
drove the 9th Brigade out of
Authie, Buron and Gruchy...
Colonel Matheson recalled
the two companies to
Bretteville early on June 8th
and placed "B" Company on
the Caen-Bayeux road facing south-east. He put Major Eric Syme in command
of "Baker." He asked me to
command "Dog" Company
and to occupy Cardonville
south-west of Bretteville
astride the railway line ...
My company was facing a
farm just south of the railway line then occupied by
12th SS Panzer Grenadiers
from Mahnke's 26th Regiment ...
It is clear now that the
Germans thought that

Norrey-en-Bessin, beingthe
furthest penetration of Allied Forces at that time,was
to be used as the break-out
point. They reckoned that
Norreywas heavily defended
with little behind it so they
made a two-pronged attack.
The western thrust came
right at us. At least 14
tanks sliced between "C"
Company at Norrey and "D"
Company at Cardonville. I
know because I was there
(in the dark). The ensuing
battle was horrendous with
the tanks circling our solid
stone house and surrounding high stone walls. The
night was lit by the burning
barns at the farm and the
tanks overran one platoon
in the orchard behind the
north wall crushing antitank guns, carriers and soldiers. The tanks ultimately
left what remained of us at
first light as our Typhoons

At 0330 hours, under the cover of
darkness, three companies ofthe 26th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion moved
north from their staging areas at Cheux. The
Battalion hoped to envelop the Regina Rifle
Regiment in Norrey by striking from two
directions. The 1st and 3rd Companies
pressed forward to the right of Norrey, while
the 2nd Company moved to the left of the
village. The German movements had not
escaped Canadian attention. The Reginas
reported several armoured personnel carriers
churning their way towards Norrey and the
embankment. 15
It appears that

were ready to pounce.
Mohnke then sent large
numbers of Panzer Grenadiers to attack "D" Company
in broad daylight. Down to
45 men and two offiers,
myself and Lieutenant Dick
Robt;:rts, we all had machine
guns of one sort or another
(several German) and were
protected in our fortress-like
position ...
I talked to Colonel
Clifford of the 13th Field
Regiment who was with Foster Matheson and gave him
coordinates for a 105-mm
barrage on the Germans at
the farm in front of our south
wall. It was the best shoot
that I ever saw in my nine
months of action. The Germans were caught in open
ground and had to withdraw.
Gordon Brown
(Lt-Col. ret'd)
April23, 1994

Sturmbannjuehrer Bernhard Krause's
battalion had no intention of achieving
surprise even though the attack was not
supported by artillery.

To the Reginas left, the German 1st and
3rd Companies passed through St. Manvieu
and crossed the Mue River. The Reginas
reacted with a torrent of small arms fire
supported by artillery. The advancing
HitleTjugend threw themselves to the ground,
suffering casualties, and a spray of machinegun fire struck down a company commander.
The assault was temporarily suspended, and

13
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the two companies dug deep into the soil. The
12th SS fared better on the Canadian right.
The 2nd Company managed to move quickly
past Norrey and charge across the
embankment. However, the failure of the
other two formations forced the extended 2nd
Company to withdraw and entrench itself
behind the embankment and within
Cardonville - a group of houses near the
edge of Bretteville. 16
The Regina Rifle War Diary described
the assault as a minor "counter-attack." 17 In
fact, the Reginas had easily repulsed an enemy
battalion hoping to force a breakthrough in a
poorly executed operation. The assault had
been undertaken without artillery support
even though no efforts were made to surprise
the entrenched opponents. Hubert Meyer
insists that this serious failure was due to
Canadian radio interference which prevented
the forward observer from communicating

Left: A forward outpost of the Regina Rifles in
Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, 8-10 June 1944.
(Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 129042)
Below: A young trooper from the 12th SS.
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with his battery. 18 Without the suppressing
effect of artillery, the Hitlerjugend were quite
vulnerable to Canadian fire. The 1st Battalion
was continuously pounded by Canadian
artillery throughout the attack, and the
pinned-down German companies waited out
the storm in forced silence. The assault cost
the battalion approximately twenty-five
casualties, while the Canadians suffered
minimal losses. 19 That the Regina Rifle
Regiment was unaware of the full extent of
the attack's scale is a testament to their
success. The Hitlerjugend had failed in their
first push.
The second attempt at a breakthrough
came after dawn. To the immediate left of
Krause's formation, the 2nd Battalion,
commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Siebken,
had methodically advanced to its starting
point around le Mesnil-Patry.
Again
highlighting the confusion present within the
12th SS, the battalion delayed its assault for
three hours owing to an order demanding
careful progress forward. 20 It did not attack
in conjunction with the 1st Battalion as
planned. Neither did the Regiment's 3rd
Battalion.
Commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Erich
Olboeter, the 3rd Battalion along with the
12th SS Reconnaissance Detachment or
Aujklaerungsabteilung, were ordered to seize
the villages to the immediate left of the 2nd
Battalion in order to secure their flank. 21 As
the Canadian 7th Brigade had not extended
itself as far as Brouay, the German objective,
Olboeter's troops seized the village without
interference. The area was the responsibility
of the British 50th Division, which had not
yet advanced as far as the Canadians. The
Reconnaissance Detachment established
itself in Audrieu linking up with forward
elements of Panzer Lehr. Positioned on the
embankment, the Germans posed a threat to
the axis between the British and Canadian
divisions.
However, British gunfire systematically
pounded the Germans until they withdrew.
Oberscharfuehrer Hans-Georg Kesslar of the
3rd Battalion described the frightening results
of the bombardment on an element of the
Panzer-Lehr Division:

We were offered a glimpse of the most
horrific face of war. The enemy had
systematically hacked an element of the
Panzer-Lehr Division to pieces with heavy
artillery. Beside the obliterated vehicles
and weapons lay the pieces of our
Comrades. Others hung from the trees. It
commanded a dreadful silence. 22

In fact, the reconnaissance detachment could
only watch as Audrieu and a nearby chateau
were reduced to rubble by naval artillery. The
troops were forced back about a kilometre to
Cristot to construct a new defensive position. 23
Artillery alone had forced the outcome.
The one reverse the Canadians suffered
on 8 June was caused by the 2nd Battalion's
assault against the unprotected flank of the
7th Brigade. At 0630 hours, Siebken's massed
companies rushed the 1. 5 kilometre distance
between le Mesnil-Patry and their objective of
Putot. 24 Canadian radio interference was
overcome and German artillery and mortars
saturated the village with high-explosives
before the Hitlerjugend stormed across a
railway bridge in front of the Royal Winnipeg
Rifles' "A" Company. 25 The Canadians resisted
the initial assault, and the concentrated Bren
and rifle fire "swept the enemy infantry away
like a scythe to hay." 26 Despite their losses,
the young men of the 2nd Battalion "came on
inexorably, taking little evasive action despite
the heavy fire that greeted them. "27 The Royal
Winnipeg Rifles remained steadfast. Finally
sickened by their losses, the Hitlerjugend
retreated to regroup. Hubert Meyer, the
official historian of the 12th SS, records that
the 2nd Battalion now understood the extent
of the Canadian defensive preparations. 28 Not
easily daunted, Siebken's troops prepared a
second assault.
Prior to their next advance, the Germans
shelled Putot extensively. The bombardment,
which included air-bursting "88" shells,
inflicted heavy casualties on the Canadian
defenders. 29 Oddly enough, snipers, thought
to be from the 716th Infantry Division, "came
to life in the buildings throughout the town
and made it difficult to move in the whole
battalion area. "30 Beginning at 0930 hours,

15
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the Panzer Grenadiers resumed the attack
with a now more cautious advance around
the Canadian strong points in Putot. By
midday, the Hitlerjugend had crossed the
embankment and overrun the village enveloping "A," "B" and "C" Companies. 31
Exhausted and short of ammunition, the
formations attempted to break out using the
cover of a thick smoke-screen in order to link
up with the still intact "D" Company. 32 Only
a few soldiers managed to escape the
encirclement, while the remainder "acquitted
themselves like Napoleon's Guard at
Waterloo. "33 With heavy losses on both sides,
the Hitlerjugend had seized Putot.
Third Canadian Division responded
quickly. Four regiments of artillery were
brought to bear on Putot, and the soldiers of
the 2nd Battalion were sent scurrying for
cover. 34 The 12th SS withstood the heavy
barrage, however, and it became painfully
obvious that a counterattack was necessary
to regain the village.
Brigadier Harry Foster made quick
preparations for the assault. At 1700 hours,
a battlegroup was formed using the brigade's
reserve battalion, the Canadian Scottish
Regiment, reinforced by two squadrons from
the 6th Armoured Regiment and elements of
the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG).
The attack would be supported by the 12th
and 13th Field Artillery Regiments. The
formation was to advance with two companies
in the lead, two in reserve, with the squadrons
of tanks covering the flanks. 35 The battlegrou p
proceeded quickly towards their collection
point at la Bergerie Farm woods, and
assembled for action. It was hoped that the
counterattack would begin at around 2030
hours.
Managing to meet the deadline, "D" and
"C" Companies moved in behind a creeping
barrage of exceptional force. 36 Mirroring the
previous defenders of Putot, the dazed and
exhausted Hitlerjugend manned their
automatic weapons and sprayed the
advancing battlegroup with machine-gun fire
-killing two officers outright in the charge. 37
Yet, the Panzer Grenadiers lacked the

equipment to repulse a determined assault
supported by armour. The Germans had
found it difficult to move anti-tank weaponry
into Putot, owing to the interference of
Canadian artillery, and shortages of infantry
anti-tank weaponry. 38 The Hitlerjugend
withdrew from Putot in the face of the
Canadian attack, and streamed towards the
embankment. Though the village was in
Canadian hands by 2130 hours, the chaotic
battle continued to rage on its perimeter, as
small groups of men stumbled through the
descending darkness. Captain P.F. Ramsey,
second-in-command of "B" Company,
Canadian Scottish Regiment, described the
battlefield as a:
... Hornet's Nest. No other term is quite
so descriptive of that hot spot. Mortaring
was still going on in strength and all the
cacophony of the full dress infantry battle
with artillery and tank support filled the
still evening air. The distinctive Burrp of
the German Machine Guns punctuated
the staccato of the Bren. Over all was a fog
of dust and smoke. 39

The Canadian counterattack succeeded .
and forced Siebken's 2nd Battalion to
withdraw south of the embankment in order
to regroup. 40 The Canadian Scottish dug-in
and consolidated, while the badly mauled
Royal Winnipeg Rifles withdrew to the rearY
Putot had been retaken, and the brigade
fortress was once again secure.
The advance of the Hitlerjugend's 2nd
Battalion had yielded nothing. Hubert Meyer
states that German losses amounted to 19
dead, 58 wounded and 21 missing- the 6th
Company being effectively halved. 42 These
statistics are almost certainly too low. 43 On
the other hand, the Canadian Scottish
suffered 125 casualties, while the Winnipeg
Rifles incurred 256. 44 The fighting for Putot
had taken on a First World War dimension heavy attrition for limited gains. The 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 26th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment had failed to dislodge the Canadian
7th Brigade from their defensive position,
and the proposed route of advance to the sea
remained shut.
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Panther knocked out by Reginas using PlATs and grenades in Bretteville on the night of 8 June.
(Photo by F.L. Dubervill. NAC PA 130149)

From the tower of the imposing Abbey
Ardennes, Kurt Meyer had monitored the
dismal progress ofMoehnke's regiment during
its fruitless attempts to clear the 7th Brigade
off of the Caen-Bayeux road.
The
Standartenfuehrer was still concerned,
however, with the movement of Canadian 9th
Brigade into the Cairon region. Any concerted
effort south through Rots threatened to divide
the two Panzer Grenadier Regiments, and
eliminate any planned offensive. 45 After
further analysis, Meyer correctly discerned
that the enemy concentration was defensive
in nature. Since the 9th Brigade had been
held in front of Carpiquet and Caen, and both
Canadians and Germans were well
entrenched, Meyer decided to turn his
attention west- "I came to the conclusion to
help my division on my regiment's left flank
with a thrust towards Bayeux." 46 Not only
would such a move aid the hard-pressed 1st
Battalion near Norrey, but it would close the
four-mile gap between the two Panzer
Grenadier Regiments. 47 The assault also
promised to outflank the forward elements of

the 7th Brigade in Norrey and trap them
against the Caen-Bayeux highway. Meyer
decided it was his turn to seize the staging
areas for the drive to the sea.
The Canadians anticipated a German
move along the Caen-Bayeux highway. The
Regina Rifles had reported groups of tanks
advancing on their positions as early as 1220
hours and again at 1700 hours. The War
Diaries record that both assaults were
repulsed. 48 Though Hubert Meyer maintains
that the HWeTjugend had not conducted
armoured operations that early in the day,
suggesting that the Canadians had simply
erred, it is evident that 3rd Division was
assuming the next blow would fall in the area
of Bretteville. 49
Meyer's plan required the armour of
Max Wuensche's 12th SS Panzer Regimentwhose tanks were still assembling near
Franqueville. 50 The plan called for the seizure
of Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse prior to the
advance towards Bayeux. 51 Why Meyer

19
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thought that he could easily breach the
Canadian defenses, considering the
difficulties of the 26th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, is difficult to understand. In
comparison to the previous battles, the forces
allocated to Meyer's grandiose operation were
strangely small. The Kampjgruppe consisted
of the 15th Kradschuetz or Motorcycle
Company, two companies of the 1st Panzer
Detachment, and a battery of self-propelled
artillery. 52 The three motorized infantry
battalions of the 25th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment were fully committed against the
Canadian 9th Brigade, and Meyer had to
force a company of engineers into the line to
free up the 15th Motorcycle Company for the
assault. 53 Only when the preparations were
completed did Meyer inform the divisional
commander of his decision and he then went
to sleep. 54 Meyer had decided to delay the
attack until dusk to avoid the hazards of air
attack.
At approximately 2200 hours, the
Kampfgruppe began to roll down the Caen-

Bayeux road towards Bretteville. The few
infantrymen designated for the mission
hopped onto the Panthers, and Meyer fulfilled
his promise to the 15th Motorcycle Company
by leading them into their first battle. 55 The
group quickly by-passed the unoccupied
village of le Bourg and crossed the Mue River
on an intact bridge. Under the cover of
twilight, the German armour advanced to
within a few hundred meters of Bretteville
before the Canadians opened fire. The
Panthers halted. 56
The torrent of Regina machine-gun fire
was well aimed, and the commander of the
15th Motorcycle Company was struck in the
stomach - "he fell down to the road to the
edge ofthe ditch." 57 Meyer's motorcycle then
took a direct hit which instantly killed the
driver and set the Standartenjuehrerablaze. 58
Meyer's men extinguished the fire, and the
undaunted commander led the wildly-firing
Panthers onto the objective. The six-pounders
of the 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment,
supporting "A" Company of the Regina Rifles
with a single troop, claimed six tanks knockedout in the first charge. The Hitlerjugend
attempted to shift the attack towards the

south, but other tanks were ignited by the
accurate artillery fire. 59
Tanks from the 4th Panzer Company
then attempted to churn their way into the
eastern edge of Bretteville, but anti-tank fire
destroyed the command tank, and the infantry
dismounted to storm forward on foot. 60 The
Germans were taken aback by the ferocity of
the Canadian response. "We were surprised
by heavy anti-tank weapons." 61 Due to the
intense small arms fire, the small numbers of
infantry could not press the attack and went
to ground. The Kampjgruppe had shattered
the Reginas' outer defenses- "several carriers
were knocked out and their position
overrun," 62 but before assaulting Bretteville
itself, the German armour shelled the village
at a distance of about 300 yards. This
continued for approximately half an hour
before the Panthers again ventured forward.
At midnight, two German tanks approached
the Regina headquarters. The Canadians
swarmed the advancing armour. One Panther
was dispatched with multiple PlAT hits and a
"necklace of 75 grenades," and the other
quickly withdrew after firing "like a child in a
tantrum." 63 Without sufficient infantry
support, the 12th SS armour circled the
village helplessly, and the fires they ignited
with their 75-mm guns merely created more
light for the Canadians to shoot by - "The
whole sky was aglow with gun fire, blazing
buildings and the dazzling of the Canadian
Parachute flares, which illuminated the
PANZERS for the defenders' anti-tank guns
and blinded the German crews." 64 It was
difficult for the combatants to understand
what was happening in the chaotic battle. At
one point, a confused German officer rode his
Volkswagen down the main street,
"dismounted and gazed around for a few
seconds until a PlAT gunner let fly a bomb
which hit him directly." 65 As late as 0445
hours, the Hitlerjugend were putting in
"determined attacks." 66
But without
additional infantry there was little hope of
success.
Late in the assault, Meyer and Wuensche
had attempted to reach the 1st Battalion of
the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, in order
to collect infantry to support the tanks, but

20
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Sherman Firefly 17-pounder
(Photo by Ken Belt NAC PA 131391)

they were driven off by the heavy anti-tank
fire. 67 Moreover, the 1st Battalion was pinned
down by the single company in Norrey and
they remained in their fox-holes. Reluctantly,
Meyer ordered the withdrawal back to Rots. 68
The Canadians had again repulsed a German
attack. Altogether, the casualties of Meyer's
Kampfgruppe totalled 152 with 43 dead. 69
According to the Germans, at least six
Panthers were destroyed, though the
Canadians claimed twelve. The improvised
assault had been repulsed, and the Canadian
"fortress" inN arrey-Putot-Bretteville remained
intact.
The 12th SS had attempted to seize a
defended position without sufficient infantry
support. Meyer himself realized this as the
fundamental reason for failure, though he
was quick to cite the strength of the Canadian
position. 70 However, it should have been
plain to a man of his experience that infantry
have inherent advantages over armour in
close-quarter combat; they are able to swarm

the tanks and get flank shots in individual
vehicles. Denuded of their infantry, the
Panthers were helpless. The most startling
fact was Meyer's insistence on remaining in
the Bretteville area for the rest of the night
when success was plainly impossible. The
Standartenfuehrer's actions might be
considered those of a confused and desperate
man. With no one was exercising command
and control, confusion reigned.
Throughout the assault on Bretteville,
the 12th SS Panzer Regiment's 3rd Company
sat idle in Authie. This formation was the last
to arrive in the staging area near Franqueville
and was unable to participate in the first
attack on Bretteville. Kurt Meyer, who had
intercepted the formation on a motorcycle,
had initially ordered the Panthers to support
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment north of
Caen. Though the 3rd Company crews heard
the noise of a fierce battle to the southwest,
they were not aware a major operation was
being conducted. 71
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At around 0900 hours on the morning
of 9 June, the 3rd Company was replaced in
the line by a detachment of PzKpfw IVs,
allowing the company to rumble through Rots
towards la Villeneuve on the Caen-Bayeux
highway. When the company reached the
junction, the crews received their first orders
to assault Norrey. Together with an infantry
attack from the 1st Battalion of the 26th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment south of the
village, the Panthers were ordered to Norrey
with the support of a small number of infantry
from the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
The assault would depend once more on
surprise, as the 12th SS could provide no
artillery support. 72
Hubert Meyer states that no one knows
who developed the plan for the assault. The
commander of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment
had been wounded, and was consequently
being attended to at a field hospital. In all
probability, the scheme was once again
devised by Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer,
who was being pressured to seize the staging
areas for a German offensive. The villages
controlled by the 7th Brigade were still
considered vital starting-points for the plan
to work. 73 The Panthers were ordered to
launch their assault at 1300 hours when the
Tactical Air Forces, still based in Britain,
would be absent.
From la Villeneuve, the 3rd Company
crossed the rail embankment through an
underpass, turned right and deployed for
battle. The 12 Panthers fanned out in a single
line at a right-angle to the embankment. A
few minutes past 1230 hours, the company
began the attack on Norrey - across open
and flat terrain covered by wheatfields. 74 The
company was led by Hauptmann Luedemann,
as the commander, Oberststurmfuehrer von
Ribbentrop, had been wounded earlier.
Though von Ribbentrop merely watched
from the rear area along with Max Wuensche,
he had recommended that the company drive
at high speeds in a broad front- only stopping
to fire their 75-mm guns. Luedemann followed
Ribbentrop's advice, and the infantry were
left far behind. 75

As the Panthers approached the village,
not yet facing any enemy fire, Luedemann
ordered the company to swing left. The five
tanks of the 3rd section hugging the rail
embankment were forced to speed past the
2nd section in order to keep a solid line of
tanks facing Norrey. The four tanks of the 1st
section had by this point slowed to form a
reserve. Although the order to swing left,
presenting the Panther's thicker frontal
armour to the Canadian defenders in Norrey,
was an understandable action, it had
consequences that the HitleTjugend had not
anticipated.
Nine Sherman tanks including several
"Fireflys" equipped with the 17 -pounder, were
being moved towards the front to reinforce
the Reginas' position in Norrey. As the tanks,
from the Elgin Regiment, were making a detour
in front of the village when they spotted the
advancing Panthers. Catastrophically for the
3rd Panzer Company, the swing to the left,
though protecting them from the 6-pounders
in Norrey, exposed their flanks to the
Shermans at not more than 1000 metres
distance. The Canadian tanks deployed in a
straight line and opened fire. 76 A "Firefly"
commanded by Lieu tenant Henry hit the tank
nearest the rail-line first. Adolf Morawetz
thought he had struck a mine; "after a dull
bang and shaking, as if the tracks had been
ripped off, the tank came to a standstill. "77
After another bang, the ammunition for the
MG-42 ignited and the Panther burst into
flames.
Before Morawetz desperately
attempted to open the hatch he had just
closed, he looked through his periscope and
watched as the neighbouring Panther
exploded- throwing the turret into the air.
Morawetz survived, but his tank and crew
had been destroyed. Six other Panthers were
quickly dispatched in the next four minutes.
The survivors, including the badly burned
crews who had bailed out of their destroyed
tanks, fled back towards the underpass. The
infantry were forced to join the men of the 2nd
Company under the bridge, as an artillery
barrage began to pound the area inflicting
heavy casualties. The converging attack of
the 1st Battalion of the 25th Panzer Grenadiers
never materialized. The assault was a
complete and total failure. 78

22

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1994

15

Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 2

The anti-tank weapons around Bretteville
were so powerful that outflanking
movements to the north and south were
thwarted. The surprising employment of
parachute magnesium flares blinded the
Panthers and lighted clear targets for the
enemy anti-tank guns. Our opponents
were especially strong on the defensive,
and they did not allow themselves to be
surprised. They fought ferociously and
bravely. 80

The face of defeat: a panzer-grenadier from the 12th
SS captured by the Canadians.

The gallant stand of the 7th Brigade
against Hitlerjugend impressed two thoughts
on the mind of the German commanders.
First, since the 12th SS was unable to throw
the Canadians off the Caen-Bayeux highway,
the planned drive to the sea was considered
hopeless. General Geyrvon Schweppenburg,
commander of the recently activated Panzer
Group West, visited Kurt Meyer at the Abbaye
Ardenne on 9 June to evaluate the progress of
the Hitlerjugend.
On hearing the
Standartenfuehrer's
report,
von
Schweppenburg uttered a sardonic reply "My dear Meyer, the war can only now be won
through political means." 79 The command
structure in disarray, the Germans and the
12th SS were now firmly on the defensive.
A second thought was impressed on the
minds of the officers and men of the 12th SS.
The Canadian 3rd Division was considered a
formation of exceptional skill, and the artillery
which they commanded inspired nothing short
of fear. Allied high explosives had time and
again inflicted severe wounds on the
Hitlerjugend. Hubert Meyer summarized this
feeling:

On the other hand, the Canadians were
less than impressed with German offensive
capabilities, though they did not question
their enemy's spirit. Brigadier Harry Foster,
commander of 7th Brigade, pointed out that
the 12th SS did not attempt to take advantage
of the open flanks of the Regina Rifles, and
the "enemy flung himself straight against the
strongest points and utterly failed to exploit
the undoubted weakness of his opponent's
position." 81 Even C.P. Stacey argues that the
Hitlerjugend assaults "leave the impression
of rather hasty and ineffective improvisation.
The attacks were pressed with courage
and determination but with no particular
skill . . . the operations seem to have been
locally conceived and control on the divisional
level was ineffective." 82 The disjointed timing
of the assaults, with Kurt Meyer's
Kampjgruppe advancing on Bretteville hours
after the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
had been repulsed from Putot and Norrey,
suggests that the regiments were not
communicating effectively, if at all. That
Meyer and Wuensche were forced to drive
towards the 1st Battalion, in order to scrape
up support for their failing assault, was
indicative of a general lack of communication,
command and control.
Clearly, the
Hitlerjugend efforts were not those of an
exceptional division.
The battles also highlight the problems
of offensive action in Normandy. The fields
around Caen were relatively open and the
notorious "bocage" lay to the Canadian right.
The battle area seemed to furnish ideal tank
country owing to its apparent lack of
significant obstacles, but it also provided
ideal conditions for anti-tank gunners. The
German Panthers paid a heavy price for
movement out of dug-in defenses.
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It is evident that the 12th SS was not
capable of conducting successful offensive
operations against prepared positions in
Normandy. Artillery and anti-tankguns were
the key to victory, and the Allies possessed
large numbers ofthese effective weapons. All
of the German assaults were checked and
defeated in detail. The 3rd Canadian Division
had won a decisive victory.

This study has shown the need for reevaluating the traditional arguments about
the military effectiveness of 12th SS and 3rd
Canadian Infantry Divisions. If the true
nature of the Normandy campaign is to be
understood the historian must avoid a
simplistic approach. The strengths and
weaknesses of specific military operations
must be evaluated without relying on broad
generalizations. Only then can the myths be
swept away. The initial Normandy battles
were significantly influenced by the
relationship of heavy weaponry to terrain, as
well as by command and control problems. It
became evident that offensive operations had
become dangerous undertakings - a reality
that would plague the Allies for the remainder
of the Normandy campaign, and give rise to
the myth of German military superiority. If
only the initial battles were to be considered,
a German army official historian might
conclude, in words borrowed from C.P.
Stacey: 83
While it seems clear that lack of battle
experience hampered the German formations in Normandy one must remark that
although some of the Allied divisions were
subject to the same disability it appears to
have had a less serious effect on them. The
3rd Canadian Division which was responsible for many of our troubles was formed in
1940 but had never fought before 6 June
1944. Moreover it did not contain a high
proportion of experienced officers and NCOs.
There were also other Allied Divisions in
Normandy which had not fought before and
which nevertheless gave a very good account of themselves. This may have been
due to the fact that heavy reverses were
suffered when Allied divisions were on the
defensive when ours were attacking, a more
difficult role. Nevertheless one suspects
that the Allies contrived to get more out of
their training than we did ...
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